Richard Loydell: Humanitarian demining could become Ukraine’s next major economic driver

Exclusive interview with Richard Loydell, Director of DOK-ING Ukraine, for Interfax-Ukraine News Agency

We had a candid conversation with Richard Loydell, Director of DOK-ING Ukraine, on how to transform Croatia’s demining success into Ukraine’s reality. Loydell explained how his company has deployed highly effective robotic systems, achieved 30% localization with plans to reach 50% soon, and transferred decades of technological know-how. Drawing direct parallels with Croatia’s journey, the retired, career military officer - who once commanded naval forces and developed the naval mine warfare strategy and doctrine for South Africa - shared his vision for demining, calling it Ukraine’s next major economic driver.

Text: Valerie Proshchenko

 

Demining Efforts, Localization, and Lessons from Croatia

**Q: Tell us about yourself, your company, what DOK-ING is doing in Ukraine, your purpose here, and what has already been accomplished.**

 

R.L.: I have 45 years of experience in the explosive risk mitigation and disposal industry having worked in the military, commercial, offshore and humanitarian sectors across most conflict-affected countries of the world. Currently, I am the Director of DOK-ING Ukraine.

DOK-ING has been present in Ukraine since the very first days of the full-scale invasion. We officially established LLC DOK-ING Ukraine on 11 October 2024, and our machines were already working here long before that. Today, we are the leader having delivered 69 robotic demining systems with most of them being operated by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), the State Special Transport Service, and leading international NGOs.

Our mission is twofold. Firstly, full localization of production in Ukraine and secondly becoming the central link that ensures flawless coordination between donors, end users, the Ukrainian government, and our parent company in Croatia. We don’t just sell machines, we deliver a complete ecosystem consisting of training, 24/7 service, spare parts, upgrades, and constant technical mentoring and monitoring.

**Q: What is the background of DOK-ING and how did the company start?**

R.L.: DOK-ING was born in a garage in Zagreb during the Croatian Homeland War.  The founder and owner of DOK-ING saw with his own eyes how mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were destroying his country and decided to build the world’s first robotic demining system. From that single prototype in the early 1990s, the company grew into the global leader in robotic demining systems, machines that have since worked in more than 40 countries and saved thousands of lives.

It took 35 years of steady, hands-on evolution in a commercial, international demining market and the motto says it all - "Don’t send a man to do a machine’s job."

Building a reliable, effective product like this takes time, serious investment, repeated trial and error, and many setbacks along the way. What made the difference for DOK-ING was that the development of the machine stayed tightly linked to ongoing demining operations around the world. Operators in the field could spot problems, suggest fixes, innovate and push the technology forward step by step.

So, what was once a small garage-based company has grown into a global leader in demining technology.

 

**Q: You mentioned localization. Is the goal 50% by 2026?**

R.L.: We have already achieved 30% localization in 2025 and our target is 50% by the end of 2026.

Our partner is A3Tech, a company with extensive experience in the production of agricultural machinery. We transferred all technical documentation, drawings, software, and know-how to A3Tech.  They do not manufacture or products under licence, they are a fully independent Ukrainian manufacturer that we support technically. Today A3Tech employs 72 Ukrainians directly, and the number is growing. Every new machine assembled in Ukraine creates jobs, pays taxes here, and strengthens the Ukrainian economy.

Our ultimate dream is for the world to see these machines not as “Croatian robots working in Ukraine”, but as a truly Ukrainian product proudly bearing the “Made in Ukraine” mark.

**Q: How long does the training process take for operators?**

R.L.: It took DOK-ING 35 years of continuous development, dozens of iterations, thousands of explosions during testing and during demining operations around the world which has made it a reliable and efficient machine.

We sent Croatian engineers who lived and worked at the A3Tech factory for many months. They trained Ukrainian welders, hydraulic specialists, electricians, diesel mechanics and programmers from scratch on some processes. Today Ukrainian teams are fully capable of independently performing any repair - mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical or electronic.

Some Croatian specialists remain in Ukraine for mentoring, training and monitoring purposes and any complex question can be solved with a phone call. End-users of our equipment undergo an intensive three-week course teaching them how to operate and maintain the machines. On completion of the course, they are officially certified by DOK-ING as an operator/maintainer.  We do not accept third parties doing the training unless they have completed our “Training of Trainers” course and they are certificated by DOK-ING.  On completion of the course, continuous mentoring and monitoring in the field is done by our staff.

 

**Q: How can Croatia’s demining experience help Ukraine? What were the key drivers behind the development of humanitarian demining as a separate economic sector in Croatia?**

R.L.: On 1 March 2026 Croatia will officially be declared mine-free, 35 years after the first mines were laid.  This is unique as the contamination was extensive in a small country that relied on agriculture, forestry and tourism as the main drivers of their economy.  The pace and scale of Croatia’s clearance was remarkable given the terrain and the relatively brief period in which the Croatian mine-free status was achieved.

There are three main lessons that we constantly repeat to our Ukrainian partners.

Firstly, state-only demining is slow, expensive, and ineffective. The initial inefficiency of state-run demining in Croatia forced change. Early efforts were slow and expensive, leading to the creation of a competitive private market. Between 1996 and 2017, Croatia hosted up to 16 foreign commercial companies, one major NGO (Norwegian People's Aid), and as many as 105 domestic private firms. By 2017, consolidation and the scaling down of clearance reduced this to about 39 companies.

Secondly, maximum emphasis must be placed on non-technical and technical surveys where you can expect that 70 to 80% of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas can be canceled or reduced without putting people at risk.

Thirdly, mechanical demining is the safest and most productive method of doing technical surveys. Croatia used DOK-ING and other locally produced machines on a massive scale doing technical surveys, and that is why they succeeded. In doing this, Croatia financed 77% of demining with its own budget and created its own sustainable market. Ukraine must move in the same direction as donor money will run out one day.

The above main lessons must not be seen in isolation as there are also other key drivers that built humanitarian demining as a separate economic sector in Croatia as follows.

• The establishment of a Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in February 1998 as the national authority.  This organisation set standards, accredited operators, coordinated planning and prioritization, conducted non-technical and technical surveys, prepared clearance projects, monitored operations (often using veterans or victims), and ensured quality management and control, creating a professional, transparent framework.
• A national economic and humanitarian urgency drove progress. Clearance was essential for rebuilding homes and infrastructure, restoring utilities, enabling refugee and IDP returns, and reviving agriculture, forestry, and tourism.
• EU funding and structured programs provided critical initial support. Initiatives like "Safe Steps" and "Safe Steps 2" (later CROSS and CROSS II) offered financing, aligning operations with EU standards and complementing national and other donor resources.
• The development of domestic technology, exemplified by DOK-ING, which created advanced mechanical and robotic demining systems to improve safety and efficiency.
• International cooperation and expertise export followed as domestic needs declined. Croatia shared knowledge and technology globally, including recent support to Ukraine through training, technology transfers, and joint projects.
• Finally, a comprehensive legal framework underpinned the success of the sector. Specific laws on humanitarian demining (starting 1996) separated it from military operations, regulated accreditation, tenders, and standards for transparency and sustainability.

In summary, Croatia succeeded by prioritizing a dedicated national center (CROMAC), clear regulations, competitive private operators under strict oversight, targeted international funding, local innovation, and an inward-looking economic recovery focus. Ukraine can adapt these elements such as a strong regulatory body, free market competition, and technology investment to sustainably accelerate large-scale clearance.

**Q: What is technical survey, and why was it so important?**

R.L.: Firstly, a non-technical survey (desktop studies, interviews, visual observation, etc) is conducted on a piece of land to gather direct and indirect evidence of explosive contamination. This survey is non-intrusive and is used to classify the land as a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.  A technical survey is the next step when you enter a suspected or confirmed hazardous area to actively investigate the ground using intrusive methods to detect, confirm or mark hazards. You do not clear everything metre by metre, but you want to prove where there are and where there are not  mines or ERW. You work with machines, dogs, or small teams and reduce the area that requires full clearance from, say 100 hectares to 5-10 hectares. In Croatia, this approach combined with DOK-ING machines reduced the contaminated area by millions of square meters at minimal cost and zero risk to human life.

 

**Q: From your 45+ years in explosives mitigation, how realistic is it to eliminate all hazards from an area?**

R.L.: Practically, it is impossible to achieve 100% clearance. Not only from a statistical point of view. Mines and ERW can bury themselves deeper in the ground, migrate during floods and may not even be detected for several reasons during technical survey or clearance operations.  Even in countries that have been declared mine-free (Croatia, Slovenia), isolated finds still occur years later. You must remember that Europe was built on the bombs of World War 1 and 2! The realistic goal is to reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the planned use of the land whether it is agriculture, building a school or in a mountain forest at 3000m. Each scenario has a residual risk that must be acceptable to the national authority because further risk reduction would be impracticable or disproportionate to the benefit gained. Trying to clear everything is not only astronomically expensive, but also unnecessary and sometimes technically impossible.

**Q:  The Tony Blair Institute’s White Paper suggests creating a dedicated government agency that would take full responsibility for humanitarian demining in Ukraine. Why is this seen as the best way forward? What are the main benefits of this approach, and which current problems would it help solve?

R.L.:  The Tony Blair Report provided an overdue, independent review of the entire sector. Ukraine's demining system has operated without a comprehensive audit or performance evaluation for too long. This study has in turn led to the need to formulate a new mine action law in Ukraine, of which I am privileged to be part of,  that is suited and adapted to current needs and realities.

Importantly, this initiative to formulate a new mine action law didn't originate in government offices but emerged from Ukraine's professional mine action communities. This reflects maturity and leadership within the sector. Similar to how expert input shaped Croatia's successful regulator, Ukraine's professionals are now driving practical, experience-based policy changes that can adapt quickly to local realities.

The biggest current problem is fragmentation. Responsibilities are spread across multiple ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Emergency Service, Ministry of Economy, and others, leading to duplicated processes, delayed decisions, overlapping mandates, and no single point of accountability. This makes effective prioritization, procurement, contractor coordination, and quality management extremely difficult. The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine has also confirmed that the existing status quo no longer matches the scale and urgency of the challenge.

A dedicated, executive authority addresses these issues head-on by creating

• A single point of legal accountability for the whole humanitarian demining effort.
• Simplified processes with duplicates removed and a clear division of responsibilities with no more overlap between agencies.
• A unified information system that integrates planning, operator accreditation, quality management, donor oversight, and more.
• Financial incentives to stimulate the local market, including liability insurance, support mechanisms for operators, and inclusion of mine action in state loan programs like 5-7-9%.
• A special legal regime (potentially under "Demine Ukraine") that creates a shared operational environment with unified rules for the state, donors, operators, and communities.
• A clear separation of military, operational, and humanitarian demining to eliminate institutional conflicts, boost efficiency, and speed up access to safe land.

The expected results will be transformative and result in a transparent, accountable, anti-corruption system aligned with international standards and donor expectations. It eliminates conflicts of interest between ministries, security agencies, and demining operators while preserving national security and civil protection integrity.

In short, this model turns a fragmented, slow system into a focused, high-impact one , exactly what is needed to return vast contaminated areas to productive use as quickly and cost-effectively as possible.

**Q: From your perspective, how can Ukraine make demining faster and more successful now, given the war and money issues? What weaknesses do you currently see in mine action in Ukraine?

R.L.: Ukraine's mine action system faces challenges right now, especially given the enormous scale of contamination. The current setup was not built for this level of contamination, and many structural and practical issues are slowing progress and raising costs.

As I mentioned before, the first issue is fragmentation. Responsibilities are scattered across multiple ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Defence, State Emergency Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Economy, and others, plus NGOs and private contractors. Croatia's success came from consolidating everything under a semi-autonomous authority, which enabled better prioritization, faster procurement, and real accountability.  Ukraine could see similar gains by treating humanitarian demining as a distinct sector.

Another big issue is what I call the "machine zoo".  A chaotic mix of donated equipment that's often outdated, incompatible, or not suited to Ukraine's terrain and conditions. This creates logistical nightmares such as mismatched parts, extra training needs, high maintenance costs on redundant or not fit for purpose machines, and the resultant safety risks. Political decisions sometimes prioritize visible "gifts" over practical needs, wasting resources and endangering teams. Standardized equipment protocols, operator certification, and a competitive private market (as Croatia did) would encourage investment in modern, appropriate technology and dramatically improve efficiency.

Funding remains a persistent and worsening problem. Despite donor commitments (over $80 million pledged in 2025 conferences), the overall need runs into tens of billions of dollars over decades. Reliance on state budgets and inconsistent international aid causes delays, tender issues, and shortfalls. A more free market-oriented approach, opening to private investment, international contractors, and competitive tenders could help bridge gaps, as seen in Croatia's mixed funding model that sustained operations through tough times.

Prioritization is another weak spot. With limited money, not everything can be fully cleared.  Focus must be on making land safe for use (cancellation or reduction through surveys, not always full clearance). The GRIT digital platform (Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies), launched in late 2025 with Palantir, aims to use AI, data, and mapping for smarter planning and prioritization. The system is promising, but still maturing and we'll see tangible results in the coming years. Without transparent, evidence-based systems, decisions will become political or arbitrary rather than driven by actual beneficiary needs and impact.

Finally, there is a broader need to work smarter, not just harder. Too much effort goes into clearing land without enough scrutiny of outcomes: Why are we demining here? Who will use the land and when? For example, why clear agricultural land to only 15 cm when farmers plow deeper than this? The correct application of standard operating procedures and national standards as applied to land type and end-use (agriculture, infrastructure, housing) would optimize spending and safety. Innovation, like AI, GPR (ground-penetrating radar), or UAVs with thermal/RGB/multispectral sensors is valuable, but it must be evidence-based and rigorously tested. There must be no shortcuts or reinvention of proven methods from decades of experience in other mine and ERW-affected countries. A central R&D function in a reformed sector could pilot these properly.

In short, Ukraine's mine action sector is making progress in releasing contaminated areas and scaling capacity. Fragmentation of control, mismatched equipment, funding uncertainty, application of prioritization tools, and inefficient practices hold it back. Shifting toward a more centralized, free market-driven, evidence-focused model (drawing from Croatia and others) would help deliver faster, safer, and more cost-effective results to get land back into productive use.

**Q: So, you don’t support “innovation approach” in demining?**

R.L.: Innovation must be evidence-based and genuinely appropriate to the context. Not driven by startup hype or donor money which has been the case in mine and ERW-affected countries. To see objects in the ground or under the water is basic physics with a bit of chemistry involved, nothing new here. Technology has advanced to make real time processing, computing power, and miniaturization a reality and this has made the operator’s life much easier.  Technologies such as ground-penetrating radar (from the 1920s), UAVs (used in mine action since 2010), airborne magnetometry, gradiometers, sub-bottom profilers, AUVs, etc are not new nor innovative. Too many companies duplicate failed approaches without a proper literature search. Ukraine would benefit from an independent and impartial centralized R&D unit to study what has been successfully and unsuccessfully attempted and implemented in the past. Ukraine is also fortunate to have the largest number of experienced and competent international mine action technical staff in country and full use should be made of their knowledge and experience. Guided by these studies, “innovative” technologies must be properly validated to determine applicability and cost effectiveness thus saving valuable funds and avoiding dead-end projects. I have seen dozens of startups around the world that raised millions on beautiful presentations and disappeared a year later.

Innovation must be appropriate to the context; cost effectively and speedily solve a real problem; be reliable in mud, frost, extreme temperatures; and be supportable and operated by ordinary people in the field.  Operational and humanitarian demining are complex systems where final decisions are made by people that are responsible and accountable.  Technology and innovation can help and reduce risks if properly applied, but it cannot not accept accountability for the result, people accept accountability.

**Q: Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy through 2033 aims to tackle massive areas of potential mine contamination by building up a market for commercial demining operators while also bolstering state-run ones to cut overall costs. But is it realistic to chase both goals at the same time? And are there examples of this working elsewhere?

R.L.: In my view, it is neither realistic nor fair from an ethical standpoint. I have not come across any similar models globally. A country trying to build up state operators while fostering a competitive commercial market always warps the market dynamics. No well-established mine action system around the world puts state and private operators on an equal footing under the same economic rules. This ends up causing inefficiencies, drives private companies out of business, and they leave the public sector hooked on endless donor funding.

Let's break this down starting with core principles. Firstly, in any healthy market economy, the state should not compete directly with private businesses. The state's job is to regulate, set priorities, ensure quality, and oversee operations, not to jump into the ring as a competitor. When the state does compete, it erodes trust, discourages investment, and hinders long-term growth in the sector.

State operators have massive built-in advantages because taxpayers foot the bill for their administration, operations, logistics and more. This makes "fair competition" a myth. Even if their prices look lower on paper, they are artificially subsidised which skews cost across the whole industry and does not show the real economic picture.

On top of that, state operators do not pay taxes on the land they clear, unlike commercial operators. There is also a major difference in what they do. State operators mainly conduct operational demining, while commercial operators focus on humanitarian demining, which follows stricter international standards like those from IMAS (International Mine Action Standards). Mixing these approaches in one national system leads to confusion, inconsistent rules, and potential backlash from international donors who expect high humanitarian compliance.

Donors pour huge funds and free equipment into state operators, tipping the scales even further. Commercial companies, meanwhile, must buy or amortise their own equipment through contracts, all while competing against this subsidised setup. Private operators don't get hand-outs, they generate revenue at their own risk, which pushes them to innovate, stay efficient, and boost productivity. But that only works if the market is stable and not undercut by state-backed rivals.

Here is a telling fact, in 2025 commercial operators in Ukraine cleared more land than state operators. This shows that when the private sector gets a fair shot, it can deliver the volume and pace Ukraine desperately needs given the scale of the problem.

Commercial operators also give back to the economy in many ways. They pay personal and corporate taxes on profits, VAT, import/export fees, fuel taxes, create jobs, buy local goods, drive growth and more. When work dries up, they must cover their own overheads or risk going into liquidation, unlike state operators who keep drawing from taxpayer or donor funds even when not productive.

In summary, state operators act like a national safety net - essential for wartime emergencies, EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) callouts, and quick response from units like the National Police or State Emergency Service of Ukraine. They are your insurance policy in a crisis. On the other side, commercial operators are the economic powerhouse as they pay taxes, employ people, spend locally, and operate on contracts wherever and whenever needed in a free-market setup. They either thrive or fold based on performance.

In the long haul, only a robust commercial demining sector can provide the scale, speed, and staying power to get contaminated land back into productive use while easing the financial load on the government. Pursuing both paths at once just risks holding back real progress.

**Q: How does Ukraine’s demining approach differ from other countries at war?**

R.L.: In most conflict zones (Africa, Middle East, parts of Asia), the UN establishes a peacekeeping mission and funds and coordinates demining operations. This demining is purely in support of the peacekeeping mission and when the demining teams are not engaged in peacekeeping duties, they conduct humanitarian demining in prioritised areas. Ukraine has no such UN Peacekeeping Mission, it has built its own system with local commercial companies having to clear vast areas.

 

**Q: What makes “operational demining” unique to Ukraine?**

R.L.: In my experience, only in Ukraine do the civilian rescuers of SESU go under fire and clear paths of explosive ordnance to restore electricity to hospitals or water to cities while the war is ongoing. This has not happened anywhere else in the world at such scale and risk except during World War 2. These people are the real heroes, and DOK-ING machines are often the only piece of equipment that allows them to do their job and return home alive.

 

**Q: How many DOK-ING machines are currently in Ukraine?**

R.L.: We have 69 machines in country (one is temporarily abroad for upgrades). The majority are operated by SESU and the State Special Transport Service. We remain the leading supplier of mechanical demining machines, we do not just sell machines, we deliver a complete ecosystem with in-country repair, training, 24/7 service, spare parts, upgrades,  technical mentoring and contributing to the economy with the localization of our product.

 

**Q: The Croatian government strongly supports Ukraine, for which we are deeply grateful. What historical connection exists between Croatia and Ukraine that influenced DOK-ING’s approach?**

R.L.: During Croatia’s 1991 Homeland War (at the time of the USSR’s collapse), Ukraine was one of the very few countries that actively supported Croatia. When Croatia was fighting for independence, Ukraine was one of the very few countries that helped Croatia with humanitarian aid. When considering full technology transfer, our founder emphasized: “Now it’s our turn to help Ukraine”.

**Q: What does DOK-ING want to achieve in Ukraine?**

R.L.: We want to grow our localization programme using our proven demining technology and to support the long-term sustainability of our machines in Ukraine. We want Ukraine to become the second home of DOK-ING and for Ukrainian engineers to continue improving their skills and knowledge on our machines so that we can support the end beneficiaries which are the Ukrainian people.

 

**Q: How has localization changed your operations? What challenges do international companies and funds see in Ukraine?

R.L.: Localization has accelerated local production and assembly, lowered costs, created jobs, and kept money circulating within Ukraine thus boosting the economy. Challenges for companies in Ukraine include war risks, prohibitively expensive insurance (especially outside Kyiv), uncertain profitability, and the government’s understandable focus on Defiance and reconstruction and repair of essential infrastructure rather than equipment purchases. Once sustainable peace arrives, multinational investment will bring large international demining firms who will most probably sub-contract local operators, accelerating scale-up.

So, there are risks and concerns with the number one being war and the related insurance risks on personnel, equipment, and profitability of operations. And the main question is who is going to pay? It is obvious that a sustainable peace is required for multinational organisations to enter Ukraine and invest. With this will come international commercial demining operations with the resultant stimulation of the local commercial demining market. The almost total reliance on donor funding, with exceptions that are provided occasionally by the state, is another serious risk and alternative practical financing solutions have yet to be found.

Negotiations with the World Bank include a track on how to integrate mine action into every reconstruction project - as a first step, not as an optional extra. This could de-risk investment decisions and create a predictable environment for both international and local operators. The structural challenge is that Ukraine has not yet treated demining as a long-term industrial and economic sector. Until it does, multinational investors will remain cautious, and scaling of local commercial operations will be constrained.

**Q: How can demining capacity be scaled in Ukraine?**

R.L.: Scaling requires stable, long-term demand, not one-off pilot projects and prototypes. We need a national industrial strategy and forward procurement planning so manufacturers can forecast and plan for production. The Center for Humanitarian Demining must group the “land plots” in the State Compensation Scheme in small geographical areas to make mobilization/demobilization between land plots cost-effective and attractive for commercial operators. Commercial operators must also consider pooling resources in a joint venture when bidding on Prozorro as this will increase their collective personnel and financial potential to enable them to afford the use of mechanical demining machines. This in turn increases the number of operators actively using machines and therefore speeds up the clearance of contaminated areas. Demining must be treated as a standalone economic sector, not a side function, to reduce investment risk, attract banks, and create jobs, technology export, and investment, just as Croatia did.

So, to create long-term demand, group “land plots” geographically in tenders thus giving commercial operators the opportunity to plan and operate cost effectively; operators must consider joint ventures when bidding on Prozorro; and properly fund commercial demining through the state compensation scheme by means of open, competitive tenders and not a fixed price per square meter.  This will make demining a viable commercial enterprise and you will see how the Ukrainian commercial demining market will grow and actively contribute to the economy and the clearance of the country.

 

**Q: Any last thoughts for our readers?**

R.L.: Mine action in Ukraine is not just a humanitarian or emergency task. It is a strategic economic sector capable of creating jobs, developing technology (as DOK-ING did from Croatia), and attracting investment. To make it work effectively, Ukraine needs a new mine action law that fits the current realities; long-term planning and demand forecasting for manufacturers; a free and open market for private operators that is not constrained by unrealistic and impractical pricing structures; localized and domestic manufacturers; and the integration of mine action into all reconstruction projects.

The Government must immediately mandate the integration of comprehensive mine-action activities into all reconstruction and development programmes implemented by national and international organisations. This approach is essential to safeguard construction personnel, protect investments, and ensure that rehabilitated land is safe, productive, and sustainable for the long-term benefit of affected communities and future generations of Ukrainians.

If Ukraine recognizes demining as a standalone sector, rather than a subsidiary function under a Ministry or humanitarian aid, it will accelerate the return of land to productive use, attract international investment, and create a truly competitive market.